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THESIS DIGEST:
MATHEMATICAL INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL POWER
AND THE ARKANSAS STATE GOVERNMENT

By Andrew King
Department of Mathematics
Faculty Mentor: Professor Bernard L. Madison
Department of Mathematics

Abstract
On the whole, political power can he very difficult to
quantify. A person may be powerful due to his or her personal
charm, wealth, fame, credibility, or influential connections.
Political bodies do not accountfor these qualities when creating
voting procedures; they only assign voting rules to specific
positions. For example, most would say that in the United States
government that a Senator is more powerful than a Representative,
but less powerful than the President, without knowing any way
to quantify or verify those differences.
Since the 1950's, mathematicians and political scientists
have attempted to create mathematical models that partially
describe an individual's power as a voting member ofa committee,
board, or legislative body. These models have resulted in four
major "power indexes" that describe the percentage ofa body's
total power held by each individual member. The four most
prominent power indexes are the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf,
Johnston, and Deegan-Packel, each of which uses a different
theory to calculate the probability that an individual's vote will
decide whether a proposal passes or fails.
The research in this paper develops formulas to calculate
the four-power indexes for legislatures that are unicameral,
bicameral, unicameral with committees, and bicameral with
committees. These formulas have several variables (up to ten)
and have many (up to several thousand) terms for typical sizes
of state legislative chambers. Using Mathematica computer
software the four power indices are computed for various
legislative configurations and the indices' behavior are studied.
Then these methods are applied to the Arkansas State Government
by calculating the power indexes of the Governor, Senate,
House, House Committee members, and Senate Committee
members. By examining the theories behind the four power
indexes and available historical evidence, the paper concludes
by analyzing which indexes, ifmy, provide the best mode/for the
political power structure of the Arkansas State Government.
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Democracy frequently requires a way to translate the
various preferences of several individuals into a single group
decision. The most common way of doing this is the yes-no
voting system, which allows individual voters to decide between
a single proposal (such as a biii or resolution) and the status quo.
A yes-no voting system is defined as a set of rules that specifies
exactly which collections of"yes" votes will pass a proposal [4].
Yes-no voting systems are defined in terms of coalitions, or
specific collections of voters. A coalition is called winning if a
proposal passes when all of its members vote 'yes' and losing if
it does not meet this condition. In almost all yes-no voting
systems, the winning coalitions are those that meet or exceed a
quota, or the minimal number of votes for a proposal to pass.
Usually, the quota is a majority, or the smallest whole number of
votes that is greater than one-half of all possible votes.

The Four Power Indices:
Power indices are methods of computing the influence of
an individual voter on whether a proposal passes or fails in a yesno voting system It is always a number between 0 and I, and the
sum of the power indices for all voters in a yes-no voting system
wiii always be I. The Shapley-Shubik Index was the first
developed.

1. Shapley-Shubik:
In 1954, Shapley and Shubik applied Shapley's previous
work regarding multi-person cooperative games to the measure
of political power. Their definition of power was based on the
probability that an individual player's vote will be pivotal, that
is, be the qth voter when the quota is q. To understand this,
suppose that all voters willing to vote for a proposal line up in
some random order and vote in turn. Once q voters have voted
'yes,' the motion is declared passed and the last voter is deemed
pivotal. The index assumes that all such orderings are equally
probable [3]. It is computed for an individual voter A by taking
the fraction of all voter orderings in which A is pivotal.
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In the process of developing the formulas and applying
them to various configurations, some very interesting properties
of the power indices were discovered. For example, two oddsized chambers in a pure bicameral system using simple majority
votes, share Shapley-Shubik power equally. Contrary to published
literature, the same is not necessarily true if one of the chambers
has an even number of voters. This result has a side effect of
producing some very complex combinatorial identities.

I
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Another way of understanding the Shapley-Shubik Index is
to assume that players align themselves in order of enthusiasm
for a proposal, with the strongest supporter first and the strongest
opponent last. There will be a number of voters "on the fence,"
which the others will have to persuade to join their respective
coalitions. The player who brings the coalition to winning
strength is "pivotal," and may determine, in the words of Shapley
and Dubey, "how strong a law will be enacted, or how much
money will actually be appropriated for some purpose, or how
hard a candidate will have to campaign, etc [2]."
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To lawyer John Banzhaf III, it was clear that [5], "voting
power is not proportional to the number of votes a legislator may
cast." In a 1960s lawsuit involving the Nassau County, New
York, Board of Supervisors, he was able to demonstrate that
three of the six supervisors were dummies, or representatives
with no actual voting power, and that the voting system of the
board was therefore unconstitutional. To do so, he invented a
new way to measure political power, which became known as the
Banzhaf Index of Power [5].

I
The Banzhaf Index is based on the idea of a critical
defector, a voter in a winning coalition who will cause the
coalition to lose if that voter is removed from it. To calculate the
Banzhaf Index for a voter p, one must first count the number of
coalitions from which p is a critical defector. This is called the
Total Banzhaf Power of p. The Banzhaf Index of pis the Total
Banzhaf Power of p divided by the sum of all voters' Total
Banzhaf Power.
:::

3. Johnston:
In 1977, R.J. Johnston, an English geographer, made some
variations to the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf voting models and
invented a new power index [6]. The Johnston Index ofPower is
similar to the Banzhaf Index in that it is based on critical
defections. But this time, each time a voter is a critical defector
from a winning coalition, it is divided by the number of critical
defectors in that coalition. As before, one must calculate the
Total Johnston Power of a voter p, denoted TJP (p) where n n
'
1' 2'
. . . ni are the number of critical defectors from each coalition:
TJP(p)

L
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4.1Jeegan-Packel:

Among the basic assumptions common among the
Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Johnston indices is
that the power to effect change is the same as
blocking power. In 1978, mathematicians John
Deegan and Edward Packel suggested that these
two kinds of power are actually different, and
proposed an index that could measure the power to
initiates changes [7]. It is based on minimal
winning coalitions- those coalitions that will be
losing if any one member is removed.
The Deegan-Packel Index of Power is based on three
assumptions:

2. Banzhaf:

,.

To calculate the Johnston Index, JI (p), one must divide a
voter's Total Johnston Power by the sum of all voters' Total
Johnston Power [4].

=lln

1 + J/n 2 + . . . + I /ni
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1) Only minimal winning coalitions are relevant
when determining power.

2) Each minimal winning coalition forms with equal
probability.
3) Any member of a minimal winning coalition gains
the same mount of power from belonging to that
coalition as all other members of the coalition [7].
To calculate the Deegan-Packel Index for a voter, one must
first calculate the Total Deegan-Packel Power for that voterthe number of minimal winning coalitions of which he/she is a
member. Then that number is divided by the sum of all voters'
Total Deegan-Packel Power.

Research Results:
The goals of this research had two central thrusts:
1) To develop formulas for computing each of the
four power indices for four legislative models:
unicameral, bicameral, unicameral with committees,
and bicameral with committees.
2) Apply the formulas to the Arkansas General
Assembly and its current committee structure.
Both these goals were accomplished and several significant
discoveries were made along the way.

The Formulas:
Formulas were developed in each of the sixteen situations
described above, and these formulas were implemented in several
situations using Mathematica computer software [9]. The
formulas are very complicated, having hundreds of terms and
requiring calculations involving very large numbers. As an
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example, the formula below is for the Shapley-Shubik index for
one committee member in a bicameral legislature with
committees. The assumption is that proposals before either
chamber are first referred to a committee for a recommendation
(pass or do not pass in the Arkansas legislature). If the committee
recommends that the proposal be adopted, then the chamber can
approve with some specified majority. If the committee does not
recommend that the proposal be adopted then a larger majority
is likely required for the chamber to pass the proposal.
Consequently there are ten variables, Nl, Cl, cl,kl, nl,N2, C2,
c2, k2, and n2, which represent the number of non-committee
members, number of committee members, committee quota,
chamber quota, and override quota for each house.

97

Power Indices for the Arkansas State Government:
Both the Arkansas House ofRepresentatives ( 100 members)
and the Arkansas Senate (35 members) have committees that
function as described above. Most House committees have 20
members [11], and most Senate committees have 7 members
[12]. Executive officers with veto power that require super
majorities to override (such as the U. S. President) will share
power with the legislative chambers. Although the Arkansas
Governor has veto power, the House and Senate can override a
Governor's veto with simple majority vote [10]. Consequently,
all four of the indices give the Governor zero power. The four
power indices were computed for the Arkansas House and
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Properties of the Indices:

Senate with committees of the current usual size. These are listed
in the following tables and show that committee members have
considerably more power than non-committee members in passing
a particular bill. They also show that the power indices of the
committees are affected by the existence of the other chamber.
The last two columns of each table show how the relative power
of each chamber is affected by the introduction of an internal
committee structure.

!combined Two Chambers

poe Chamber and Its
w--ommittee

land Their Committees
jNon
!committee lcooumttee
~ommittee ~ommittee
Member
Ratio Member !Member !Ratio
Member
Non

S/wpley·
Shubik
!Arkansas
House, size
12o committee
!Arkansas
Senate, size 7
[committee

0.03042

0.00489

6.21

0.01856

0.00227

8.18

0.05204

0.02270

2.29

0.02401

0.00997

2.41

The work to establish techniques for analyzing the power
structure of bicameral legislatures has yielded several important
discoveries. First of all, several complex combinatorial identities
have been discovered, including the complex expression for the
Shapley-Shubik Index of a committee member shown above. By
programming each index into Mathematica, one can create twoand three-dimensional graphs that illustrate the behavior of each
power index as a function of committee size,
chamber size, and quotas. Examples of such
Sum of Power ~umof
behaviors are that increasing the quota of both
without
!Power with
chambers almost always increases the power
f"'ommittees Committees
of the larger chamber, that a committee is
always
more powerful than a voting block of
0.5204 0.5528
the same size, and that the four indices exhibit
widely different behaviors at extreme values.
0.6453
0.4796 0.4472

!without0.3548
without
jcombined Two Chambers
land Their Committees

lone Chamber and Its
Committee
l'

Ban:.lulf

!Arkansas
House, size
[committee

~

~rkansas
~enate, size

t

~umofPower ~umof
!Non
INon
Committee !committee
Committee ~Committee
jPowerwlth
Ratio !Member !Member !Ratio lrommittees Committees
!Member !Member

0.02023

0.00744

2.72

0.01510

0.00416

3.63

0.6350

0.05291

0.02249

2.35

0.01893

0.00830

2.28

0.3650

~committee

,.,.

I

Ji

lone Chamber and Its
Committee

[combined Two Chambers
and Their Committees

j

INon
k:ommittee Pwmittee
Member Member
Ratio

INon
~umofPower Sum of
Committee [committee
Power with
Member !Member [Bano 1....

I

Johnston
~rkansas

I,

,I

i
I'

!,

!House, size
[committee

12o
jArkansas

0.37751
Senate,

0.00306

123.28

0.09458

0.00161

10.45

0.4060

0.4666

0.00715

6.66

0.5941

0.5334

0.01207
7.84

size

0.01687

0.04762

17 committee
One Chamber and Its
Committee
Deegart·
Packel

~rkansas
House, size
20
[committee

!Arkansas
Senate, size
17 committee

Combined Two Chambers
~d Their Committees

t

Non
Non
Sum of Power Sum of
Committee [committee
Committee Committee
without
Power with
Member
Member
Ratio Member
Member
Ratio Committees Committeees
0.01178

0.00955

1.23

0.00864

0.00700

1.23

0.73193

0.732822

0.03200

0.02771

1.15

0.00854

0.00741

1.15

0.26807

0.267178

https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol4/iss1/16

One of the most notable results of this
analysis actually contradicts an assertion
originally made by Shipley and Shubik in
1954. Regarding the properties of the ShapleyShubiklndex, they stated, 0 oo In pure bicameral
systems using simple majority votes, each
chamber gets 50% of the power (as it turns
out), regardless of the relative sizes [3].oo±
This is true ifboth chambers are the same size,
or if both chambers have an odd number of
members, which was proven by simplifying
the formula for the Shapley-Shubik Index
withMathematica. The simplified expression
was proven to equall/2 by Emeritus Professor
John Duncan, using double induction on the
residues of the tangent and gamma functions
of a complex variable.
But examples show that two chambers
do not always share power equally when one
or both of them have an even number of
members, such as the Arkansas State
Legislature, which has a 100-memberchamber
with S2% of the power and a 35-member
chamber with 48% of the power. This may be
confirmed by visually inspecting the following
two graphs. The graph on the left plots the
Shapley-Shubik Index of a variable odd
chamber with a majority quota against a fixed
odd chamber with 49 members and quota of
25. The graph on the right plots the ShapleyShubik Index of a variable even chamber with
a majority quota against the fixed odd chamber
with 49 members. Each point on the horizontal
axis represents the quota of the variable
chamber. Notice that the Shapley-Shubik
Index of the odd chamber remains constant
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SSI

Odd vs.Odd

SSI

Evenvs.Odd

0.615
0.5
0.5

0.65
0.625

0.5
0.5

40

50

0.575
0.55

0.525
at.5, while the Shapley-Shubik Index of the even chamber
declines as it gets larger.

Conclusions:
This research has provided several revealing insights into
the political power structure of bicameral legislatures, including
the Arkansas General Assembly. The four power indices all
confirm the strong influence of legislative committees, and all
show that a committee is always more powerful than a voting
block of the same size. The power indices also indicate some
relationships that are somewhat surprising. For example, internal
committees affect the relative power of two chambers. It also
seems that the relative power of a committee is affected by the
size and existence of another chamber.
The ability to program formulas for each power index and
situation into Mathematica has lead to several meaningful
discoveries about the properties of each power index. Among
these properties are the effect of relative chamber size, the effect
of quotas, and the overall influence of committees on a bicameral
legislature.
Being able to understand the four power indices as
mathematical functions lays the basis for evaluating which index
provides the best measure of power for the Arkansas State
Government. There are unique characteristics of each index that
should be considered. For example, the Deegan-Packel Index is
very consistent across the three systems -bicameral, unicameral
with committees, arid bicameral with committees-but does not
place much power in legislative committees. The Banzhaflndex
varies the most widely among the three voting situations, but
gives a moderate amount of power to legislative committees.
The Shapley-Shubik Index is based on fundamental concepts of
game theory and distributes power in a fairly consistent manner.
When complemented by historical and political analysis, these
characteristics could be used to determine which, if any, of these
indices are effective measures of voting power in bicameral
legislatures such as the Arkansas General Assembly.
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From the UN Security Council to the University of Arkansas
student government, voting bodies make many important
decisions that affect large numbers of people. Therefore,
ascertaining the power of individual voters is a worthwhile
undertaking. This research takes advantage of the latest computing
technology, establishing several techniques that can be used to
evaluate a wide variety of voting bodies. These techniques
provide a way to quantify voting power and could be used to
design more effective legislative systems.
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Faculty Comment:
Mr. King's faculty mentor, Professor Bernard Madison had
this to say about Mr. King's research:
Andrew's research area is outside anything we offer
inundergraduateorgraduatestudies.Theonlyrelated
courses in mathematics are in introductory
combinatorics. Consequently, Andrew began by
reading through Alan Taylor' sMathematics and Politics
(Springer-Verlag, 1995) and several research journal
papers to establish a knowledge base for this research.
From the beginning, Andrew wanted to investigate
mathematical measures of political power. This led to
a study of yes-no voting systems, which can be
considered as part of cooperative/ competitive game
theory. The use of game theory to study distribution
of power in voting systems can he traced back to John
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their 1944
classic, Theory ofGames and Economic Behavior. Results
in this area moved into the public eye with the book
and movie, A Beautiful Mind, about the life of Nobel
Laureate John Forbes Nash.
Over the past half-century, four indices of political
power have been developed, often as results of legal
arguments over legislative apportionment and voting
rights. The four indices carry the names of their
creators: Shapley-Shubik (1954), Banzhaf (1965),
Johnston (1978), and Deegan-Packel (1978). The
Shapley-Shubik index is best known and emerged in
Andrew's work as the one receiving most attention
and often making the most sense. Andrew's research
focused on the application of these indexes to
legislatures: unicameral, bicameral, unicameral with
committees, and bicameral with committees. His main
results were obtained by achieving the following two
rather ambitious goals:
1. Developing expressions for computing each of the
four power indices for each of the four legislative
models - for committee members, non-committee
members, and the full chambers.
2. Applying the four indices to the Arkansas General
Assembly and its current committee structures.
Until recently, computing these indices for a state
legislative body was virtually impossible because of
the complexity and the large numbers involved. For
example, computing the Shapley-Shubik index for
the Arkansas Senate and House of Representatives
requires summing several thousand terms involving
ten variables and then dividing by 135, a 231-digit
number! Andrew developed expressions to do this
and then used Mathematica for the computations. The

https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol4/iss1/16

formulas are extremely complex sums of binomial
coefficients and factorial expressions and represent a
major accomplishment-in my view an
accomplishment that is most extraordinary for an
undergraduate research project.
Along the way to these two main goals, Andrew
discovered results that give glimpses of the
interrelationships of the indices and reveal very
interesting aspects of their behavior when applied to
bicameral systems. For example, Shapley and Shubik,
in their 1954 paper, state, "In pure bicameral systems
using simple majority votes, each chamber gets 50%
of the power (as it turns out), regardless of the relative
sizes. "They were referring to what is now known as
the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of power.
Andrew was able to prove this (using Mathernatica
and computing residues of the tangent and gamma
functions of a complex variable) if the size of each
house in the bicameral system is odd and if each quota
for passing a proposal is the simple majority. However,
if the sizes of both chambers are not both odd (as in the
Arkansas General Assembly), then the chambers need
not share power equally, even when using simple
majority votes. Andrew showed this by constructing
examples with small numbers as well as with the
Arkansas General Assembly. A sideresultofknowing
that the above result for odd-sized chambers is a
wealth of very complex combinatorial identities.
Andrew's research is significant, complex, and highly
relevant. As far as I am able to discern, many of his
results are original; indeed, he developed all results
independently. Although mathematical power
indexes cannot account for many of the aspects of
political power (for example, all the indexes give the
Arkansas Governor zero power in the legislative
process because only simple majorities are required
to override a veto), they do give insight into structural
issues in legislatures. Not surprisingly, they show
that committee members considering a bill have
considerably more power over that bill than do noncommitteemembers.So,Andrew'sworkshouldhave
wider appeal than most research in mathematics. His
accomplishments far exceed what I consider normal
for a strong undergraduate honors thesis, and he has
achieved these accomplishments with minimal
guidance from me. He has showed uncanny ability to
sort through and organize some enormous counting
problems, to program the resulting expressions in
Mathematica and to interpret the results with maturity
far beyond his experiences. His intuition about both
mathematics and politics helped immensely.

6

